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George J. Stigler:
An
Appreciation
Ronald H. Coase

IN

A WORLD in which so much offends, it is a
comfort when something happens which is
clearly right. The award of the Nobel Prize
for economics for 1982 to George J. Stigler represents such a happening and consequently has
given widespread pleasure. Stigler's contributions to our subject command our admiration
and our gratitude. The Royal Swedish Academy
of Sciences is to be congratulated on showing
such fine judgment in making its award in 1982.
The award will not, of course, enhance Stigler's
reputation among his colleagues in the economics profession. It was already high. But in
setting the seal on his achievements, the Swedish Academy will undoubtedly lead some economists, less familiar with his work, to study his
writings more closely and to learn, as the rest
of us have, the power and interest of his ideas.
The Swedish Academy of Sciences stated
that it had awarded the Nobel Prize to Stigler
for his "seminal studies of industrial structures,
functioning of markets, and causes and effects
of public regulation." This is just. But this citation, with its long account of Stigler's work,
nonetheless conveys an inadequate notion of
the character of his contributions to economics.
His range of subject matter is wide. He is
equally at home in the history of ideas, eco-

Ronald H. Coase, editor of the Journal of Law and
Economics (1965-82), is the Clifton R. Musser professor emeritus of economics at the University of
ChicagoLaw School.

nomic theory, and the study of politics. Even
more remarkable is the variety of ways in which
he handles a problem; he moves from the marshaling of high theory to aphorism to detailed
statistical analysis, a mingling of treatments
which resembles, in this respect, the "subtle
and colourful" Edgeworth. It is by a magic of
his own that Stigler arrives at conclusions
which are both unexpected and important.
Even those who have reservations about his
conclusions will find that a study of his argument has enlarged their understanding of the
problem being discussed and that aspects are
revealed which were previously hidden. Stigler
never deals with a subject which he does not
illuminate. And he expresses his views in a style
uniquely Stiglerian, penetrating, lively, and
spiced with wit. His writings are easy to admire,
a joy to read, and impossible to imitate. He is a
man sui generis. Age shall not wither nor custom stale George Stigler's infinite variety.
the Swedish Academy makes
no mention of Stigler's studies of the history of
economic thought, but in them he is, I believe,
seen at his best. His first book, Productionand
IN ITS CITATION,

DistributionTheories (1941), which shows the

influence of his great teacher, Frank Knight, is
wholly concerned with this subject. Of course,
being Stigler, his critical comments, which he
rightly suspects some will consider hypercritical, on the handling of the analysis by the great
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economists whose work he examines, end by
being a substantial contribution to economic
theory in their own right. This interest in the
history of economics and of the men who made
it has remained with Stigler, and articles such
as "The Development of Utility Theory" or
"Perfect Competition Historically Contemplated" (reprinted in his Essays in the History of
Economics, 1965) are masterly treatments of
their subjects.
Stigler also uses his extensive knowledge
of the history of economics to examine more
general questions, and in particular to attempt
to uncover the forces which have governed the
development of economic theory itself. The thesis of his essay "The Influence of Events and
Policies on Economic Theory" (also reprinted
in the 1965 volume) is striking. He argues that
"neither popular economic problems nor heroic
events influence much the development of economic theory.

.

.. The dominant influence on

the working range of economic theorists is the
set of internal values and pressures of the discipline." Similarly, in his recent Tanner lecture,
given at Harvard in 1980, he argued that
economists are not addicted to taking frequent and disputatious policy positions....
The typical article in a professional journal
is unrelated to public policy, and often apparently unrelated to this world. Whether
the amount of policy-advising activity is
rising or falling I do not know but it is not
what professional economics is about.
The claim that the development of economic
theory is not much influenced by current events
in the economic world and that the work of the
economic theorist is not much concerned with
economic policy is not, at first sight, very plausible, but I am convinced that Stigler's conclusions are largely true. While Stigler's knowledge of the history of economics is mainly used,
as one would expect, in his historical studies, it
never fails to influence his treatment, no matter
what subject is being discussed. Unlike most
modern economists, his investigation of an economic problem is always informed and enriched
by his knowledge of the work of earlier economists.
Most academic economists presumably
know Stigler, above all, as the author of a very
successful textbook dealing with what is now
called microeconomics, The Theory of Price
(1946, with revised editions in 1952 and 1966).
22

Though there are many revisions, rearrangements, and substitutions in going from one edition to another, fundamentally the book has remained unchanged. There must, however, be
many who have regretted the disappearance of
some of the illustrations to be found in the 1946
edition, such as the extremely amusing account
of the difficulties of getting effective collusion
on prices among bakers in Illinois. It is not an
easy text but it is excellent for anyone seriously
interested in training to become an economist.
Unfortunately, many of my students seem to
have had other ambitions. A textbook, however,
is not the place to display innovations in economic analysis, and despite the fact that there
are some very Stiglerian passages, particularly
in the later editions, the Swedish Academy was
no doubt right to ignore it when it set out those
of Stigler's contributions to economics for
which the award was given. The subjects dealt
with in The Theory of Price are those that one
expects to find in a price theory textbook and
even the treatment is, in many respects, quite
conventional. Of course, as in all his writing,
Stigler's exposition is penetrating, lively, and
spiced with wit, but these are not the qualities
which lead to a Nobel Prize.
singled out for
commendation was Stigler's work in the fields
of industrial organization and the economics
of regulation. In economics the subject of industrial organization means, as the Swedish
Academy indicates, the study of market processes and the structure of industries. However,
for reasons which are not altogether clear to
me, it is a field which has come to concentrate
on The Monopoly Problem and, more specifically in the United States, on the problems thrown
up by the administration of the antitrust laws.
The result has not been a happy one for economics. By concentrating on the problem of monopoly in dealing with an economic system which
is, broadly speaking, competitive, economists
have had their attention misdirected and as a
consequence they have left unexplained many
of the salient features of our economic system
or have been content with very defective explanations. The link with the administration
of the antitrust laws has tended to make matters worse by importing into economics that
imprecise analysis (if that is the proper word)
WHAT THE SWEDISH ACADEMY
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which abounds in the judges' opinions in antitrust cases.
Stigler's articles on industrial organization
are reprinted in The Organization of Industry
(1968), and most are concerned with monopoly
and antitrust policy. However, he transcends
the weakness of most discussions of these questions by an impressive use of empirical data (as
in "The Economic Effects of the Antitrust
Laws"), by an analysis more precise and more
searching (as in "Price and Nonprice Competition" or "A Theory of Oligopoly"), and by discussing interesting and significant problems (as
in "The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market"). Nonetheless, although the
analysis proceeds at a much higher level than
is usual, it remains true that most of the subjects discussed are those commonly dealt with
under the heading of industrial organization.
But Stigler is not like the others. Like a mountain raised by a volcanic eruption, standing high
and strange in the surrounding landscape, there
is to be found in The Organizationof Industry
a paper of a quite different kind. It is his article
on "The Economics of Information," rightly regarded as Stigler's major contribution to economic theory, and it is no surprise that it was
picked out by the Swedish Academy for special
commendation.
Stigler's starting point is that at any one
time there exists an array of prices charged by
different suppliers for the same good or service.
Those wishing to discover the lowest price will
engage in what Stigler calls "search." The more
suppliers are canvassed, the lower the price that
a buyer can expect to pay. But as there are costs
to search and the marginal gains from increased
canvassing tend to diminish, there will be an
optimum amount of search for each buyer. This
conclusion is not invalidated by the fact that the
actual dispersion of prices will be affected by
the amount of search undertaken by buyers.
There are, of course, ways in which search costs
can be reduced-by localization, advertising,
specialized dealers, firms which collect and sell
information, and so on. The analysis throws
considerable light on the function of these business arrangements and on the way in which a
competitive system operates. Particularly important is that it has led to a greater recognition of the role of advertising as a provider of
information. But the effect of the analysis is
pervasive. As the Swedish Academy says, "phe-

nomena such as price rigidity, variations in delivery periods, queuing and unutilized resources, which are essential features of market
processes, can be afforded a strict explanation
within the framework of basic economic assumptions." Economists can be expected to
continue to probe the implications of Stigler's
analysis and with considerable benefit to economics.

ALTHOUGH STIGLER HAD WRITTEN

on rent con-

trols and minimum wage legislation in the
1940s, it was not until the 1960s that he began
writing the articles on the economics of regulation that were reprinted (along with many
previously unpublished essays) in The Citizen
and the State (1975). Three appeared in 1964.
At the end of that year, Stigler gave the presidential address to the American Economic Association on "The Economist and the State."
His message was twofold. First, economists,
whether they were in favor of limiting government intervention or of expanding it, had not
hesitated to express their views on what the
role of the state in economic affairs should be,
without making any serious attempt at discovering what the effects of government intervention had been and without making a systematic
comparative study of the results achieved by
private and public enterprise. Second, we now
have at our disposal quantitative methods to
investigate such questions. "The age of quantification is now full upon us . . . economics is at

the threshold of its golden age." Stigler had himself already done extensive quantitative work,
his book, Capitaland Rates of Return in Manufacturing Industries, having been published in
1963. In the context of his presidential address,
what Stigler was calling for was a study of the
effects of regulation using quantitative methods.
One did not have to look far to see what he
had in mind. Earlier in 1964 Stigler had published the results of a quantitative investigation
into the effects of regulation on electricity rates
(written with Claire Friedland). The study
could not discover significant effects. Again, in
the same year, in the course of reviewing a report on the regulation of the security markets,
Stigler compared the result of investing in new
issues in the period before and after the formation of the Securities and Exchange CommisREGULATION, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1982
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sion. No important difference could be detected. In the 1960s and 1970s there was a flood of
similar studies investigating the effect of regulation on a wide range of economic activities.
Some were directly influenced by Stigler's
work. Others were no doubt independently conceived and executed. The results of these studies
were uniformly depressing. Either, as in Stigler's studies, no effects of regulation could be
detected or, when they could be discovered, the
effects were, on balance, bad. With regulation,
prices were higher, products were less well
adapted to consumer demands, and competition was restrained.
About twenty years ago, most economists,
under the influence of the writings of Pigou and
others, thought of the government as standing
ready to put things right whenever the results
produced by the working of the market were in
some respect defective. This led them to support extensive government regulation. The studies which have been made since then have
shown how pernicious the results of regulation
have commonly been. It has become difficult to
argue with plausibility that the ills of society
can be cured by government regulation and the
views of most economists have changed accordingly. In bringing about this change of view,
Stigler has played a major part.
It has become difficult to argue with
plausibility that the ills of society can
be cured by government regulation and
the views of most economists have changed
accordingly. In bringing about this
change of view, Stigler has played a major
part.
Stigler has not been content merely to investigate the effects of regulation. He went on
to inquire why the regulations are what they
are and this led him to analyze the working of a
political system. His approach was that of an
economist, treating political behavior as utilitymaximizing, political parties as firms supplying
regulation, with what is supplied being what is
wanted by those groups (or coalitions) which
are able to outbid others in the political market.
What each group will bid depends on the gain
to be derived from the regulation less the costs
24

of organizing for political action. In practice the
highest bidder was very likely to be the industry
regulated and it is not therefore surprising to
find that the regulation, as Stigler puts it, "is
designed and operated primarily for its benefit." If Stigler's approach is accepted, it will
change the way economists look at regulation
since it means, as the Swedish Academy points
out, that "legislation is no longer an 'exogenous' force which affects the economy from the
outside, but an 'endogenous' part of the economic system itself."
Just how much political behavior can be
explained in this way seems to me problematical. As I watch people who are engaged in political activities, whether through voting in a
parliamentary system or by taking part in political, including revolutionary, movements,
supporting with enthusiasm policies which
seem likely to greatly harm or even destroy
their countries and perhaps themselves, I find
it difficult to believe that such behavior is best
described as rational utility-maximizing. However, that does not mean that in some areas, and
particularly those of most interest to an economist, Stigler's approach may not have great explanatory power. The Swedish Academy speaks
with caution about his analysis of the causes of
regulation: "it is still too early to assess its ultimate scope." But, in any case, we should not,
and the Swedish Academy clearly does not, assess the worth of an economist's contributions
by deciding whether the profession will ultimately conclude that he is right. All theories
will in time be superseded by others and all will,
ultimately, come to be regarded as false (or incomplete or irrelevant). What really matters is
whether the contribution moves the subject forward, makes us aware of possibilities previously neglected and opens up new and fruitful avenues of research. Stigler's contributions clearly
meet this test.

MARSHALL

DEFINED

A CLASSICAL

ECONOMIST

as

one who "by the form or the matter of his words
or deeds .. . has stated or indicated architectonic ideas in thought or sentiment, which are in
some degree his own, and which, once created,
can never die but are an existing yeast ceaselessly working in the Cosmos." Using Marshall's
definition, George Stigler is a classical economist.
E
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